Neo-corporatism and the state by SCHMITTER, Philippe C.
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
E U I  W O R K I N G  P A P E R  No. 106 
NEO-CORPORATISM AND THE STATE 
by
PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER
European University Institute, Florence 
and
University of Chicago



























































































This paper should not be reproduced 
in whole or in part without 
the prior permission of the author
(c) Philippe C. SCHMITTER 
Printed in Italy in May 1984 
Badia Fiesolana




























































































NEO-CORPORATISM AND THE STATE
Philippe C. Schmitter 
European University Institute 
and
University of Chicago*
The "state" has become a bit like the weather. Social scientists 
in recent years have been talking a great deal about it, but 
haven’t been able to do much with it. Articles and books now 
display the concept prominently in their titles, but no one seems 
quite sure what it is. We have been exhorted to somehow "bring 
it back" into our analyses (Skocpol, 1982), but we haven’t been 
told where it fits.
The burgeoning literature on neo—corporatism has contributed 
significantly to this revival of interest in the state (Cawson, 
1978; Maraffi, 1983), but it has not resolved the problem of what 
or why the invocation of such a portentious concept adds to our 
understanding of politics in advanced industrial/capitalist 
societies. On the one hand, it has been (correctly) credited 
with calling our attention to the multiple ways in which the 
structure and action of public authorities affect the identifica­
tion and organization of interests; on the other hand, it has 
been (rightly) criticised for not telling us enough about the 
circumstances and motives under which these authorities intervene 
to change the ways in which individuals and groups perceive their 
interests and act collectively to defend them. In short, it is 
one thing to put the state into a theory and quite another thing 






























































































But is it really possible any longer to speak o-f a state theory 
or a theory o-f tbe state in the advanced industri al/capi tal ist 
societies o-f Western Europe and North America (Jessop, 1982)? 
Most o-f the conditions which previously allowed theorists to 
treat the state as a distinctive social institution are no longer 
present to the same degree. For example, its imputed capacity 
■for UQLty. Q£ act.i.QQ seems dubious in the -face o-f abundant evi­
dence o-f competitiveness and incoherence among its multiple 
agencies and levels. SQY.ecei.U.Qty used to be considered the 
hallmark o-f stateness, but tew would argue that, today, even the 
largest and most powerful o-f state units have the ultimate 
capacity to determine autonomously and authoritatively the allo­
cation o-f all private goads and public statuses within their 
respective territories. "Internal" capitalist relations have long 
restricted the state's effective exercise of sovereignty, but the 
more recent development of transnational processes and supra­
national regimes have added so many new external constraints that 
the claim is no longer credible. Indeed the very concept of 
sovereignty now seems quaint and has become virtually extinct in 
normal or academic usage.
Other allegedly distinctive properties of the state: its asso­
ciation with a particular nation and the spirit of nationalism; 
its capacity for the defense of a specific territory; its 
pretense to embody the common and universal interests of the 
citizenry; its claim to centrality in all political calculations; 




























































































zation according to unique (bureaucratic) principles, have not so 
much disappeared as they have weakened or lost their exclusive­
ness. The modern state has either diminished in its command of 
these properties, or has been -forced to share them with other 
institutions in (and outside) its own society. What is le-Ft is 
an amorphous complex o-f agencies with very ill—defined bound­
aries, performing a great variety of not very distinctive 
functions. As a symbolic and systemic totality, the state may 
still command a relative superiority of coercive power within a 
given territory and a legitimate authority to use that power to 
enforce certain norms, but even these capacities are subject to 
unprecedented contestation and restriction. In short, we are 
being asked to bring the state back into our analyses precisely 
when it least resembles what it was historically and theoretical­
ly. If we are to do this effectively, we cannot merely revive or 
retrieve out-dated assumptions about this institution. We must 
revise and reconstruct them.
Paradoxically, what seems to have motivated this new fashion is 
the claim, advanced by social scientists from a wide range of 
political perspectives, that the contemporary state has been 
"taking weighty, autonomous initiatives" (Skocpol, 1982, p.l) 
which go beyond or against the demands and interests of existing 
social groups. Precisely when its distinctiveness, its unity, 
and its sovereignty have diminished, the state in Western Europe 
and North America appears to have increased "its" capacity to 
penetrate society with "its" policies —  to affect citizen 
behavior, to extract resources, to collect information, to 
regulate economic exchanges, to distribute goods and services —  




























































































both puzzling and unprecedented. Indeed, this emergent property
has provided the central -focus, the principal eiipl^D^ndUfl) and 
enalPQans, Of contemporary efforts at theorizing about the state.
The mere fact that so many schools of thought have uncovered this 
analytical lodestone does not, however, imply there is an agree­
ment on what this autonomy means, why it is significant or how it 
is to be measured. Conservatives interpret what has happened in 
recent decades as a decline in the state's "real-historical" 
mission to pursue distinctively public or civic goals, and attri­
bute its cause to a change in the pattern of recruitment whereby 
ambitious and self-serving, middle class professionals have dis­
placed disinterested and public-minded aristocrats in the control 
of state agencies. Traditional liberals point to the unprece­
dented growth in the volume and variety of state activities and 
argue that relative autonomy emerges as an unanticipated conse­
quence from the sheer complexity and fragmentation of these 
efforts at regulation and subsidization, with each agency and 
agent competing for power, status and budget shares. For many 
Marxists, the phenomenon lies not in behavioral or institutional 
factors, but in functional ones. Capitalism, at this stage in 
its development, requires a functional apparatus which is capable 
of ensuring the general conditions for capital accumulation and 
social cohesion. To do this, the state must acquire an indepen­
dent strategic capacity to forge unity within the dominant class, 
overriding its particularistic interests, and to extract consen­
sus from subordinate classes, coopting and/or manipulating their 
partial interests.
So, there is agreement among "state-centered theorists" that 




























































































them concerning what it is and why it exists. The state may (some 
would say, must) formulate and implement policies that are not 
merely reflective of established preferences and articulated 
demands of groups, strata and classes within society, but it is 
not clear whether this capacity is a permanent attribute or an 
episodic occurrence, a functional necessity or a contingent 
choice, a consistent property or an issue-specific response. 
Underlying these theoretical (and, at times, scholastic) diver—  
gences, is the central issue of whether the state has "interests" 
of its own —  and the distinctive resources to make them prevail 
in the face of resistance by those with conflicting interests. 
This, in turn, is linked to the question of whether the state can 
design its own "policy instruments", i.e. whether it can choose 
the terrain and format for its interaction with social groups and 
can impose upon these groups the conception of interests and mode 
of collective action it prefers. This is where neo-corporatism 
may enter the picture as one possible mode of restructuring 
state—society relations.
POLITICAL DESIGN?
Regardless of the "school" of neo-corporatism —  and there are 
many —  its students would agree that it is unlikely to emerge or 
to persist without the active connivance or complicity of state 
agencies. Interest associations will not attain the status of 
monopoly representatives or form comprehensive hierarchies of 
sectoral and class coordination without some degree of official 
recognition, if not encouragement. Nor will they become regular, 
integral participants in policy-making or acquire direct respon- 
sabilities for policy implementation without the tacit agreement, 




























































































are, therefore, necessary but not su-F-ficient causes of neo— 
corporatist arrangments. In democratic polities, state agents 
can try to bring about such patterns, but their efforts can -fail 
(See McBride, 19S3 for a case study of this). Affected groups 
may refuse to organize themselves appropriately; targeted organi­
zations can turn down the invitation to participate; incorporated 
associations can defect if they find the costs of col1aborating 
too high. To use an Italian expression, neo-corporatism depends 
on a scamtliQ politica, a political exchange in which organized 
interests and state agencies calculatedly, if not always willing­
ly and enthusiastically, agree^to^a particular pattern of formal 
representat i on and substantive negotiation j(Pizzorno, 1978; Ceri , 
1980-81; Rusconi, 1981 and 1983; Mutti, 1983; Regini,1983).
From this perspective, such arrangements cannot be seen as a 
deliberate act of "state control" over the expression of class or 
group interests (Cf. Panitch, 1979 and 1981; Jessop, 1979; 
Strinati, 1978 and 1982) —  whether the state is interpreted
as acting out of its institutional self-interest or as enforcing 
the general class interest of the bourgeoisie. Rather, this sort 
of compromise is possible only where some degree of balance in 
the organized expression of class forces exists —  and where the 
organized expression of other interest cleavages in the society: 
ethnic, religious, generational, positional, gender-related, etc. 
can be disregarded or set momentarily aside. This is not to say 
that the classes involved must have achieved a "parity" of power
—  that capital and labor must have the same capacity to influ­
ence state policy or to extract benefits from public authorities
—  for neo-corporatist arrangements to come about. If this were 




























































































duration. Rather, the relevant interlocutors must be in a situa­
tion o-f "mutual deterrence", each su-F f i ci entl y capable o-f organ­
ized collective action to prevent the other -from realizing its 
interests directly through social control and/or economic ex­
ploitation, and each su-f f i ci ent 1 y incapable o-f unilateral manipu­
lation o-f public authority to impose its interests indirectly 
through the state. In such a context o-f imposed bargaining 
(Crouch, 1977), both the room and the necessity for intervention 
increases. State agents acquire the capacity to make an indepen­
dent and significant contribution towards the negotiation of a 
more stable and institutionalized interest compromise and, at the 
same time, are empowered to extract some "pub1ic-regarding" con­
cessions from the bargaining associations. Such a relative 
autonomy is neither "behavioral" in the sense that it depends on 
the preferences of civil servants (Nordlinger, 1981); nor is it 
"functional" in the sense that it stems from the imperatives of 
ensuring the long-run imperatives of capitalist reproduction
(Foulantzas, 1972 and 1975); nor is it "tactical" in the sense of
DC
just disguising the interests of a non-ruling dominant class 
behind the fajade of state neutrality (Block, 1977). It is 
"structural" and grounded in the institutional interests of the 
State.
The more comprehensive neo-corporatist arrangements, at least as 
they have emerged in the political democracies of Western Europe 
since World War II, have not been the result of the willful 
calculation of some autonomous state actor or the "hegemonic 
project" of some progressive class fraction. They have not come 
about through deliberate, grandiose efforts at "political design" 




























































































postwar settlements in Belgium and the Netherlands, they have 
been the largely unintended outcome of a series of disparate 
interest conflicts and policy crises in which none o-f the class 
or state actors involved was capable of imposing its preferred 
solution upon the others. Typically, they began as second-best 
compromises which no one really wanted or defended openly —  
hence, their general invisibility, their uneven distribution and 
their precarious legitimacy. State actors would usually have 
preferred authoritative regulation; business representatives an 
allocation through market forces; and labor leaders a redistribu­
tion of wealth and/or a redefinition of property rights. Neo­
corporatism satisfies none of these projects, but incorporates 
elements of all of them. It is, therefore, both actually conser­
vative in that it reflects existing property and power relations, 
and potentially transformative in that it subjects them to expli­
cit and repeated negotiation. Class compromise is, thereby, 
moved from the plane of individualistic adaptation and parliamen­
tary manoeuvre to that of inter— organizational bargaining and 
contract formation.
All this would be unnecessary, if the state really was as auton­
omous as some have argued in its recruitment patterns, inform­
ational resources, agenda-setting and implementation capacities. 
Pierre Birnbaum, for example, has argued that France —  the only 
country in the world with a real state in his opinion —  is 
incapable of developing neo-corporatist arrangements 
(1982a,p.111. For a rather different version of state-interest 
association relationships in France, see Hall, 1982; 
Pontusson,1983; and of corporatism in that country, see Schain, 




























































































omy due to the overwhelming hegemony of capitalist interests, 
neo—corporatist bargaining will be rejected as a heretical and 
wasteful impediment to the efficient operation of market farces. 
The United States has frequently been cited as a case in point 
(Wilson, 1982), although even there some traces of corporatism 
have been discerned (Wolfe, 1977; Lustig,1982; Milward and 
Francisco, 1983). Great Britain, which was (erroneously in my 
view) earlier placed in the avant—garde of neo-corporatism 
(Harris, 1972; Pahl and Winkler, 1974; Winkler, 1976; Newman, 
1981), has more recently been identified as a place where the 
balance of organized class forces and state capacities is no 
longer (not yet?) appropriate for the task (Crouch, 1979; 
Jessop,1980; Regini,1983).
POLICY INSTRUMENT?
If the emergence of such arrangements cannot be attributed to 
some grand "political design" of the state or some hegemonic 
class fraction, can they be assigned the more modest status of a 
"policy instrument", a format chosen to resolve particular prob­
lems, and, if so, why it and not some other means of coping with 
interest conflicts? The mere existence of mutual deterrence and 
organizational stalemate may make stable and comprehensive neo- 
corporatism possible, but they do not make it inevitable —  or 
desirable. It is not the only instrument available in the policy 
L^p^ctQice of advanced capitalism. Indicative planning, public 
ownership of productive assets, selective subsidization, state 
regulation, control of the money supply, centralized executive 
authority —  all offer alternative means for dealing with its 
conflicts and contradictions. Not only have these been tried 




























































































pre-ferencEs" of powerful constituencies and are often more com­
patible with cultural norms and democratic values than the 
"second-best" and dubiously legitimate institutions of neo- 
corporati sm.
One answer which has been proposed is that such arrangements are 
preferred and promoted, not by the relatively autonomous state, 
but by relatively autonomous groups within it, i.e. by specific 
bureaux and agencies. In response to their discrete needs for 
information, compliance, legitimacy and support vis-a-vis 
competing units, civil servants seek to coopt their clients and 
find systems of functional representation useful for these pur—  
poses. No doubt, one could find many instances where public 
officials took the lead in establishing such relationships, 
rewarded interests which formed or merged into monopolistic asso­
ciations, encouraged representatives to take a longer-term and 
more "responsible" view of their member interests and sought to 
insulate policy deliberation from partisan, territorial and/or 
popular pressures.
Civil servants are likely to be much less enthusiastic about 
effectively sharing decision-making power with interest associa­
tions and especially about devolving upon them the authority and 
material resources necessary for the implementation of policies. 
Nor are they likely, in a 1iberal-democratic polity, to be able 
to control as much as they would like the processes of leadership 
selection and demand formation within formally coopted associa­
tions —  unless it is in the calculated interest of these groups 
to consent to such adjustments. Efforts by zealous and autono­
mous authorities to go beyond these implicit limits would be 




























































































i-f the dominant motive in thedisillusioned followers. Also, 
formation of neo-corporatist arrangements was the cooptive 
preference of civil servants, this could only explain the pro­
liferation of "bipartite" or "tripartite" forums of functional 
representation attached to particular bureaux or agencies, not 
the emergence of comprehensive "trans-sectoral" institutions for 
negotiating and implementing macro-economic and social policy 
throughout the polity. These require much more extensive polit­
ical, i.e. party and parliamentary, support (Armingeon, 1982; 
Armingeon et al., 1983); Lehmbruch, 1983; Lehmbruch and Halle,
1983). Admittedly, social pacts of this scope are not that 
common and have had a precarious existence in many countries; 
nevertheless, they do constitute the most salient and powerful 
utilization of this policy instrument, its best claim to being a 
means for significant restructuring of the relations between 
civil society and the state apparatus.
This suggests (to me) that, while neo-corporatism may not be 
"architectural", it is not purely "artisanal". The macro­
functional imperatives of capitalist reproduction may be too 
vague and indeterminant to explain its emergence —  especially 
its very uneven distribution across sectors and countries in 
Western Europe and North America —  and the micro-behavioral 
preferences of civil servants may be too circumscribed and in­
effectual to explain its significance —  especially its differen­
tial contribution to political and economic outcomes in these 
countries (Schmitter, 1980; Schmidt, 1982,1983; Cameron, 1978, 
1983). The answer, I propose, lies at the meso-level, i.e. in 
the relationship between the interests of class/sectoral organi­




























































































former are defined less (and less) by the elevated goal of 
attaining hegemony and imposing a distinctive "class project"upon 
the whole of society, and more (and more) by the prosaic objec­
tive of influencing public policy to ensure a stable or expanding 
share of rewards within the existing order. To do this under 
contemporary circumstances, classes must get organized and that 
requires overcoming the "free-riding" limitations imposed by 
voluntary membership and the "free—booting" temptations inherent 
in individualistic or particularistic access to political power 
(See Schmitter, 1981, for a more complete exposition of this 
argument). This in turn implies a possible organizational int­
erest in exploiting state authority to resolve the paradox 
inherent in liberal associabi1ity, i.e. by making (de jure or de 
facto) member contributions and compliances compulsory. In such 
cases, associational consent to neo-corporatist arrangements may 
not just be contingent upon the satisfaction of immediate member 
preferences. Where meso-calculations of this sort have asserted 
themselves, classes may eventually come to learn that it is in 
their interest to have their preferences and behaviors governed 
by intermediary organizations and subjected to state interests.
"State interests", however, have proven as difficult to define 
and intractible to measure as has "relative autonomy". Tracking 
down what is distinctive to this particular historical mode of 
organizing political space requires, first, that its institution­
al interests be distinguished analytically from those of two sets 
actors, governments and civil servants, who occupy positions 
within the state and who frequently claim to be acting in defense 
its interests. Unfortunately, the literature fails to make 




























































































con-fusion about the role o-f the state in establishing and main­
taining neo-corporatist arrangements.
"Government interests" can be defined structurally in terms of 
ensuring the reproduction of an existing distribution of public 
offices and established means of gaining access to them, and 
conjunctural1y in terms of seeking to remain in control of those 
offices. In stable liberal democracies, this means that there is 
a likelihood that politicians will act to preserve government 
based on electoral accountability and territorial representation, 
and will take whatever steps are feasible and tolerable to pro­
mote their (or their party’s) re-election. Neither of these 
generic interests is intrinsically favorable to neo-corporatism. 
Indeed, the contrary is more likely to be the case. Only where 
party competition has been temporarily suspended, as during a 
Grand Coalition government, or where such arrangements can be 
shown not to threaten regime norms or incumbency resources, are 
they likely to be promoted or tolerated by government interests 
in the strict sense in which they have been defined here.
"Civil Servant Interests" also have their structural and conjunc- 
tural aspects. On the one hand, the employees of the state have 
an interest in perpetuating an ensemble of institutional identi­
ties, recruitment patterns, cultural norms and professional stan­
dards which define their particular status in society. On the 
other hand, they have have a set of situs-related preferences 
with regard to salaries, perquisites, job security, career oppor­
tunities, budget shares, and so forth for which they periodical­
ly struggle and which bring them into conflict with other social 




























































































vants may develop an interest in promoting neo-corporatism as a 
means -For coping with a specific policy problem, but it is by no 
means clear whether they, as a Stand, have some inherent pro­
pensity for this sort of arrangement. Its tendencies to blur the 
line between public and private institutions, to require exten­
sive consultation with affected groups, to acquire devolved 
resources from the state and, in the extreme case, to take over 
substantial responsabi1ity for the implementation of policies 
could all be interpreted as antithetic to the long term interests 
of civil servants.
"State interests" are obviously difficult to distinguish empiri­
cally from those of its principal agents —  governments and civil 
servants —  even if it is possible to point to numerous situa­
tions in which the actual efforts of these groups to get re­
elected or rewarded have clearly undermined the objective or 
subjective capacity of a given state. Nevertheless, any politi­
cian coming to power or any functionary taking office is likely 
to learn fairly quickly what these are and what limits they 
impose upon his or her actions. First and foremost, the inter—  
ests of a state are defined by the interstate system of which it 
is a part. The "compellingness" of this interdependence with 
units claiming similar capacities and status is not a constant. 
Relative size, geographic location, material and human resources 
may seem relatively fixed, but their significance as constraints 
and opportunities varies with such factors as military techno­
logy, strategic doctrine, balances of power, alliance patterns, 
and so forth. Western Europe since the end of World War II has 
witnessed some enormous changes in the threat potential within 




























































































sians of national aggrandizement and imperial domination. Baring 
a dramatic shift in the global balance of power and attendant 
adjustments in military security, the international interests of 
its states have focused and will continue to focus to an unprece­
dented degree on gaining advantage within a highly competitive 
world economic system. Neo-corporatism has reflected this devel­
opment in paradoxical fashion. It has been promoted at the 
sectoral level as a device for protecting domestic (and, more 
recently, regional) interests from external competitors and it 
has been exploited at the level of the entire economy as a means 
for improving a country’s external competitiveness. This has 
periodically brought about a convergence of state interests and 
the interests of specific class segments (of labor as well as 
capital, not to mention agriculture as a whole), but it is ques­
tionable whether such arrangements would have emerged had the 
former’s interests not been at stake. States with less inter—  
nationally penetrated or vulnerable economies have made much less 
use of them.
The other realm in which a distinctive state interest is discern— 
able concerns the exercise of its most important attribute: 
legitimate authority. This is backed ultimately by the resource 
which, at least in theory, it is supposed to monopolize: physical 
coercion, but if this were to be relied upon too frequently the 
"economy" of the state form of political organization would 
diminish greatly. So, in addition to defending its territorial 
integrity and international status, the state must safeguard its 
vital interest in the efficacy of the decisions (laws and 
decrees) which it alone has the capacity to promulgate 




























































































it does so by developing and perfecting the capacity to punish 
those who transgress these norms. But its special ability to 
extract voluntary compliance depends also on the credibility of 
its symbolic status as that unique social institution which 
embodies and protects the public interest, i.e. those interests 
which all its citizens/subjects have in common yet cannot realise 
because they are divided into competing and conflicting groups. 
However false this universality may seem to critics at a given 
moment and however fraudulently a given government or 
administrative apparatus may manipulate it to serve its own 
interests, the state must uphold such a claim, at the expense of 
all other social institutions. Historically, as Max Weber has 
pointed out, this has involved reliance upon a variety of 
formulae or belief systems. In modern states, the legal-rational 
one is predominant and neo-corporatist arrangements have a 
complex relation with it.
As we have hinted above, such arrangements depend crucially on 
authority in order to extract member contributions, but most of
all in order to ensure member compliances, and normally the only
available legitimate source for this is the state in which they
are embedded. One can imagine that in restricted contexts and at
certain moments, associations could secure compliant behavior
from some combination of intellectual persuasion, social coer—
cion, historic venerability and/or leader charisma, but for
larger groups and longer periods these sources are not likely
to remain reliable, especially if they are seeking to enforce a
conception of group interests which diverges from individual
perceptions of immediate advantagement. For this they need what
the Austrians call "a whip in the window", i.e. a credible and




























































































bargains and contracts. State actors may be willing, indeed 
eager, to devolve such a comofilenCE upon non-state organisations 
by granting them an exclusive public status and by backing their 
agreements with the status of public law —  provided this does 
not undermine the state's claim to universalistic defense of the 
public interest or generate demands upon the state’s command over 
scarce resources. By such a process of devolution <StEEtsent~ 
lasiung), authorities are relieved of direct responsabi1ity for 
intervening in matters of considerable complexity and controver—  
siality while retaining their symbolic status as sovereigns and 
enhancing their real ability as guardians of public order.
In practice, however, neo-corporatist arrangements are not always 
so compatible with state interests. They may result in a very 
substantial increase in claims on scarce public resources in the 
form of subsidies, fiscal exemptions, subsidiary programs, etc. 
which are extracted as compensations in order to ensure agreement 
among the contracting social parties. They may produce negative 
externalities for excluded interests in the form of higher 
prices, restricted access, unemployment, polution, etc. which 
cause affected groups to respond in unconventional ways by ques­
tioning the state’s commitment to protecting the general 
interest. Most "subversively", the establishment of so many 
quasi-independent sites where generally binding regulations can 
be elaborated through arcane processes among restricted private 
participants and implemented without accountability to wider 
publics (and occasionally without reference to constitutional 
norms) may undermine confidence in the very institution of public 
law itself. Especially where neo—corporatism has become entren­




























































































property, production relations, job security, remuneration, 
■fringe benefits, pricing, credit, entry into the market, and so 
-forth become highly di -f -f erent i ated by class, sector of production 
and profession. The modern liberal state is thereby deprived of 
one of its most important symbolic resources: the universality of 
its legal order.
If the perspective developed above has any merit, the emergence 
of neo-corporatism (and its persistence) cannot be predicted from 
the micro-motives of interested private individuals or public 
employees. Nor can it be analyzed exclusively in terms of the 
macro-functional imperatives of either the capitalist economy or 
the democratic polity. These demands and constraints no doubt 
should play a role in understanding the contingent conditions 
which might favor the choice of this policy instrument rather 
than another, but the structural point of departure lies at the 
meso-level in an arrangement of mutual convenience between 
representatives of interest associations and representatives of 
state authority. Both have something to offer each other which 
neither may be able to obtain on their own. Both also have
something to fear from each other. The interest organizations 
may have the aggregated information and, most of all, the capacity to 
deliver the compliance of their members with respect to specific 
aspects of public policy. What they have to fear is cooptation, 
their transformation into dependent recepients of public favors 
and passive agents of state policy. State authorities have the 
capacity to provide attractive and selective rewards, and to 
accord public status to consenting organizations which could 
protect them from those who would offer rival representation or 



























































































doing, they will became colonized by the associations they have 
empowered and will lose their distinctive and exclusive status as 
protectors o-f the public interest, and thereby their legitimacy 
before the public at large.
Whether this delicate quid. p.CQ QUQ will be tried and, if so, 
whether it will prosper, is not to be predicted from behavioral 
surveys of individual preferences or from functionalist analyses 
of system properties. What is relevant are power configurations 
and organizational opportunities. Hence, neo-corporatist
arrangements are more likely to emerge where class hegemony is no 
longer a plausible option (e.g. where socialist or social- 
democratic voting strength and presence in government is high) 
and where rival "projects" do not divide class actors (e.g. where 
interest associations are not internally divided by ideology, 
ethnicity or religion). They are also more likely to be found in 
nations which never had or have given up pretensions to great 
power status (e.g. small, neutral countries or larger ones which 
have suffered international defeat) and in economies which are 
specially subject to external competition (e.g. those with a high 
proportion of GNP in imports and exports). Looking at specific 
sectors or policy areas within countries, one would expect that 
the neo-corporatist temptation would be greatest in the case of 
interest organizations whose potential members are so large in 
number and dispersed in location that voluntary associabi1ity is 
severely impaired (e.g.farmers and petty bourgeois), whose member 
interactions are particularly competitive and potentially ruinous 
(e.g. the construction industry and retail trade), and/or whose 
categoric goods can only be produced reliably when backed by 




























































































materials, price-fixing, limitations on technological 
innovation). On the side of the state, authorities will be more 
tempted to enter into neo-corporatist commitments where they 
cannot obtain necessary information on their own and/or where 
they cannot implement policy without the active consent of 
targeted groups (e.g. where they seek to intervene in matters 
related to production, investment and employment rather than the 
more traditional areas of infrastructure provision, income 
distribution, consumer protection or social welfare).
As for the level of the state at which such political exchanges 
are structured, that obviously depends a great deal on formal, 
constitutional structure. National arrangements among peak 
associations attempting to set comprehensive parameters on wages, 
working conditions, employment practices, fiscal systems, welfare 
benefits, prices, etc. were what initially attracted the 
attention of scholars. More recently, they have been 
particularly inventive in discovering "local corporatisms", 
although these often seem little more than mechanisms for the 
direct consultation of functional interests without the wider 
implications for intermediation or devolution implied in the 
national agreements (Hernes and Selvik, 1980; Dickens and 
Goodwin, 1981; Flynn, 1983; King, 1983; Milward and Francisco, 
1983; Cawson, this volume). Ironically, the privileged site has 
long been that of professional categories and economic sectors 
where the associational desiderata, agency needs and policy 
characteristics have converged to form quite stable and well- 
insulated arrangements of mutual convenience, often at high cost 
to the economy at large (For a particularly striking example of 




























































































different interest configurations,see the monographs on the dairy 
industry by Grant, 1983; van Waarden, 1983; Trailer, 1983; or on 
the food-processing industry more generally by Coleman and Jacek, 
1982; Farago, Ruf and Wieder, 1984). The net result of such 
"sectoral or selective corporatisms" is a pattern of entrenched 
policy segmentation which renders more difficult and less 
effective efforts at either comprehensive concertation or mone­
tary control. Moreover, the forging of "crisis cartels" to deal 
with the problems of declining industries seems to be extending 
this ad-hocracy with serious implications for the governabi1ity 
and competitiveness of national economies (Esser and Fach, 1981; 
Esser, 1982).
Regardless of the opportunity structure from which they emerge, 
the nature of the interests incorporated in them, the level of 
the state at which they operate or the scope of public policy 
they are capable of affecting, neo-corporatist arrangements 
ultimately depend on their success or failure at establishing 
what an increasing number of analysts have come to call "private 
governments". It is to this theme that we now turn.
PRIVATE INTEREST GOVERNMENTS?
The concept of "private government" has been given such diverse 
meanings (McConnell, 1966; Gilb, 1966; Lakoff and Rich, 1973; 
Lowi, 1979; Buxbaum, 1982; Thompson, 1983) that it seems, first, 
necessary to define it clearly and, second, to explain its rel­
ationship to neo—corporatism. A private interest government (PIG 
is the unfortunate acronym) exists where a non-state association 
allocates goods, services or statuses which are monopolistic in 




























































































affecting and potentially controlling their behavior, and does so
with the specific encouragement, license or subsidization of the 
state, therefore, imposing certain public standards and respons­
ibilities on the behavior of the association. In short, a PIG is 
based on group self-regulation through formally private 
organizations, empowered by a devolution of public authority and 
legitimated by a claim to acting in the public interest. The 
insertion of the word, "interest", in the middle of the concept 
is intended to convey the meaning that a generic social category 
is involved —  classes, sectors or professions are the usual ones 
—  and that this group is expected to act from calculatedly self- 
regarding motives.
This definition excludes many collectivities which have been 
called "private governments" in the past: secret societies, 
organized crime, guerrilla movements, business corporations, 
cartels, para-state agencies, "quangos", etc. All these may dis­
tribute monopolistic and indispensable goods and, hence, be cap­
able de lattQ of controlling the behavior of their clients, 
followers, beneficiaries or victims, but they either do not have 
members in the same sense as an interest association, or they do 
not represent a generic social category, and/or they have not 
received a mandate for exercising public functions.
What may be more difficult is to distinguish PIGs from other 
configurations of organized interest—state interaction which also 
can fit the neo-corporatist profile. One which has received a 
great deal of attention, especially in the North American 
literature, is that of "privatized government" in which an 




























































































or colonizes a particular agency o-f the state and is able to make 
private use o-f its public powers o-f regulation, taxation, 
subsidization, etc. (McConnell, 1966; Lowi, 1979). A second 
configuration which has especially preoccupied scholars working 
on Latin America and Southern Europe emerges where a state —  
usually under authoritarian rule —  creates, coopts or controls 
an interest association and is thus able to use it to coerce its 
leaders or members (Malloy, 1977). In both these cases, one 
-finds elements o-f neo—corporatism whether conceived as interest 
intermediation or as policy-making. But neither colonization o-f 
the state nor subordination to it constitute private interest 
governance in the sense that I am proposing here.
Leaving aside those PIGs which have been inherited -from the 
medieval-early modern past, and which somehow survived the 
Napoleonic and Liberal assaults o-f the Nineteenth Century on 
guild privileges, their contemporary emergence depends on a 
particular, and often highly contingent, distribution of 
resources across the public and private organizations which agree 
to form them. Especially crucial is the role of the state. It 
must be, on the one hand, autonomous enough in the policy arena 
at issue not to be "colonizable" by the interest or interests 
involved, and credible enough to threaten these interests with a 
worse possible outcome —  usually direct regulation —  if they do 
not agree to repect the "public-regarding" provisions it imposes. 
On the other hand, the state must be weak enough to recognize 
that the costs of authoritatively implementing a given policy 
will exceed its likely benefits and willing enough to devolve 
some of its most distinctive resource —  legitimate coercion —  




























































































political exchange, public authorities are neither brokers nor 
mediators. They are not just fashioning a policy instrument 
which will modify relationships between civil society and them­
selves, but consenting (and in some cases, conniving) in the 
creation of new measures of social control which will affect 
relationships within civil society itself.
From this perspective, the emergence of private interest 
governance is not synonymous with the emergence of 
representational monopolies or institutionalized participation in 
policy-making —  just a possible and contingent outcome of such 
developments. Increase in the variety and scope of state 
activities does not make it a functional requisite. Increase in 
the frequency with which public agents take "weighty, autonomous 
initiatives" does q q I. make it a political imperative. Increase 
in the spread of bureaucratic organization in society does nat 
make it a rationalistic necessity. However these might contribute 
to its likelihood, the emergence of PIGs depends on a 
distinctively political calculus involving a specific 
distribution of existing power capabilities and an anticipated 
reaction with regard to future impact upon affected interests.
Moreover, the success of such arrangements is, by no means, 
assured —  even where they have been well-established. On the 
state side, so—to-speak, their viability and desirability depends 
on their public-regarding content and state-respecting form. 
This, in turn, is contingent in democratic regimes upon such 
factors as maintaining a rough electoral balance of class and 
sectoral forces, ensuring the application of professional stan­
dards of civil service conduct, respecting the material interests 




























































































of community consciousness and public attention to the policies 
involved. Perhaps even more crucial to guaranteeing that PIGs 
will not degenerate over time into "privatized governance" is the 
need to sustain an independent and adversarial relation between 
the privileged interests incorporated within them. This may be 
very di-f-ficult to ensure where the beneficiaries of such arrange­
ments are relatively concentrated (and well-organized) and their 
victims are relatively dispersed (and usually poorly organized).
Seen from the associatianal perspective, the obvious danger is 
that PIGs will develop over time into mechanisms of state control 
or exploitation, either because cooptation undermines the 
capacity of leaders to take autonomous action or because 
complicity undermines their legitimacy in the eyes of their 
members. In the neo-corporatist discussion so far, the 
evaluative accent has been placed upon "asymmetry" in the 
distribution of benefits and organizational capacity among 
participating class actors —  mostly, capital and labor. However 
important this question may be (and evaluations of it have 
changed rather dramatically in recent years), the emphasis on 
private interest governance shifts the axis somewhat and asks 
what are the longer-term distributional consequences for the 
state and non—state interests involved. Just as it was previous­
ly assumed that capitalist interests always prevailed over worker 
interests, so it is often presumed that the state (and the public 
at large) will always be exploited by PIGs. Why this "must" be 
the case brings us back to that contested concept of the relative 
autonomy of the modern state. If this is simply fraudulent or 
tactical, i.e. the state is "really" at the instrumental service 




























































































—  then, private interest governance is just an ideological 
illusion. I-f its relative autonomy has a -functionalist basis, 
PIGs have a useful role to play in policing the long-term 
interests of the dominant class and suborning those of the 
dominated class, but in the event of any significant conflict the 
capitalist state will reveal its true colors (Offe, 1983). If, 
however, the basis of its relative autonomy is structural, then 
the emergence of PIGs to cover specific policy sectors or to set 
trans-sectoral, macro-economic parameters is a development of 
much greater significance. It remains vulnerable to cyclical 
fluctuations in the influence of class associations and to 
structural trends which undermine their capacity to deliver the 
compliance of their members —  both problems which may affect 
trade unions more severely than business and professional 
associations (Baglioni, 1982; Carrieri and Donolo, 1983) —  but 
this by no means assures that state authorities will always be 
incapable of asserting and defending the interests of less- 
organized and underprivi1eged publics. Nor is it necessarily the 
case that "government interests'* as expressed through traditional 
1iberal/piuralist forms, e.g. territorial representation and 
partisan competition, would do a better job of this.
ASSOCIATIVE-CORPORATIVE ORDER?
In a recent essay (1984), Wolfgang Streeck and I have speculated 
that, to the extent that neo-corporatist trends have resulted in 
private interest governments of varying scope, composition and 
viability, it may be possible to speak of a new "model" of social 
order with its own distinctive logic of action and reproduction 
(For other efforts at placing neo-corporatism within prevailing 




























































































sophical thought and social science has, heretofore, been 
dominated by three such models, each identified by a different 
central institution; the CQmcQLiai.ty, the cnacket and the state 
which embodies and enforces a distinctive axial principle: 
seeatacieaus saLi.daci.ty, dtseecsed CQmp.eti.ti.ea and btecacctitc 
CQQtCQL. In Table I are outlined summarily the properties which 
are assumed by these much-discussed models, with the market one 
subdivided into economic and political "sections". In Table II 
we have suggested how those of a possible as5QCi.ati.yE:zCQCQQCati.Y£ 
order with its guiding principle of Qcaaoicatianal CQDCSCtatian 
might differ from these. Our point is not that this "new" order 
is somehow destined to prevail over the others or even to assume 
an equivalent significance in all advanced industrial/capitalist 
societies, but that modern social order is composed of a mix of 
institutions with different actors, motives, media of exchange, 
resources, decision rules, cleavage patterns and normative 
foundations —  and that the traditional trio of community, market 
and state fails to explore all the possible bases and 
combinations.
(Place Tables I % II here)
The idea of a distinctive associative order is, of course, not 
new. Hegel was perhaps the first to advance a conception of 
&QCp.QC.at.LQQ£Q as the highest expression of civil society and he 
was fallowed by a long list of Nineteenth Century theorists, 
religious and secular, who advocated some form of organic- 
corporative order as an alternative to the anomic decline in 
community, the anarchic competition of the market and the 
possible tyranny of the nation-state. The £act of a distinctive 




























































































































































































































TABLE II: THE PROPERTIES OF AN ASSOCIATIVE MODEL OF SOCIAL ORDER
1 C u i d i n g  P R I N C I P L E  of I n t e r a c t i o n  a n d  
A1 l o c a t i o n
Intel—  and I n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c o n c e r t a t i o n
2 P r e d o m i n a n t ,  modal. C O L L E C T I V E  A C T O R  
O t h e r  A C T O R S
F u n c t i o n a l l y  d e f i n e d  i n t e r e s t  a s s o c i a t i o n s .  
M e m b e r s  (firms, c o n s o r t i a ,  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  s o c i a l  
g r o u p i n g s ) .  I n t e r l o c u t o r s  ( s t a t e  a g e n c i e s ,  
part i e s ,  m o v e m e n t s )
3. E n a b l i n g  C O N D I T I O N S
for a c t o r  e n t r y  and i n c l u s i o n
C a p a c i t y  for m u t u a l  d i s r u p t i o n .  A t t a i n  nent 
of m o n o p o l y  st a t u s .  W i l l i n g n e s s  a n d  c a p a c i t y  
to c o m p r o m i s e .  S y m m e t r y  of o r g a n i  z a t i o n a l  
c apac ity
4 P r i n c i p a l  M E D I U M  OF  E X C H A N G E M u t u a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  of s t a t u s  and e n t i t l e m e n t s ;  
C o m p l i a n c e  of m e m b e r s
5 P r i n c i p a l  P R O D U C T  CP  E X C H A N G E P a c t s
6. P r e d o m i n a n t  R E S O U R C E ( S ) G u a r a n t e e d  a c c e s s .  C o m p u l s o r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n  and 
m e m b e r s h i p .  I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  f o r u m s  of r e p r e s ­
e n t a t i o n .  C e n t r a  1 i z a t i o n .  C o m p r e h e n s i v e  scope. 
J u r i s d i c t i o n  a n d  C o n t r o l  o v e r  m e m b e r  b e h a v i o u r .  
D e l e g a t e d  tasks. I n t e r - o r g a n i z a t i o n a 1 t r u s t
7. P r i n c i p a l  M O T I V E ( S )  of s u p e r o r d i n s t e  a c t o r s
P r i n c i p a l  M O T I V E ( S )  of s u b o r d i n a t e  a c t o r s  
C o m m o n  M 0 T I V E / C A L C U L U 5
E x p a n s i o n  of o r g a n  n a t i o n a l  role. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
d e v e l o p m e n t .  C a r e e r  a d v a n c e m e n t  
L e s s e n e d  u n c e r t a i n t y .  P r o p o r t i o n a l  shares. 
" S a t i s f i c i n g  ( m i n i - m a x i n g )  i n t e r e s t s "
8 P r i n c i p a l  D E C I S I O N  R U L E ( S ) P a r i t y  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  P r o p o r t i o n a l  
a d j u s t m e n t .  C o n c u r r e n t  c o n s e n t
9. M o d a l  T Y P E  O F  G O O D S  p r o d u c e d  and 
d i s t r i b u t e d
C a t e g o r i c  g o o d s
10 P r i n c i p a l  L I N E S  O F  C L E A V A G E  
O t h e r  C L E A V A G E S
M e m b e r s  vs. A s s o c i a t i o n a 1 L e a d e r s  vs. 
( S t a t e )  I n t e r l o c u t o r s
I n c l u d e d  vs. E x c l u d e d  ( s o c i a l  m o v e m e n t s )  
W e l l  o r g a n i z e d  vs  L e s s  w e l l  o r g a n i z e d  
E s t a b l i s h e d  vs. R i v a l  A s s o c i a t i o n s  
O v e r  vs U n d e r - r e p r e s e n t e d  
M a j o r i t y  vs. M i n o r i t y  S e g m e n t s  
N a t i o n a l  vs. R e g i o n a l  vs. L o c a l  I n t e r e s t s  
( p a rties, m a v e r i c k  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  c o m m u n i t y  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  l ocal n o t a b l e s )
11 Predoeiinant N O R N A T I V E - L E G A L  F O U N D A T I O N P a c t a  s u n t  s e r v a n d a , F r e e d o m  of a s s o c i a t i o n
12. P r i n c i p a l  P A Y - O F F ( S ) L e s s  c l a s s  e i p 1 o i t a t i o n i  M o r e  s y m m e t r i c  d i s t r i ­
b u t i o n  of b e n e f i t s )  G r e a t e r  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  a n d  



























































































speak, in the experiences o-f the late medieval cities o-f Italy, 
France, Catalonia, the Rhineland and the Hanseatic North whose 
social and political systems were based for a brief period on a 
guild structure (For an excellent, recent case-study of ancient 
"municipal corporatism", see Najemy, 1982). Interestingly, when 
John Maynard Keynes reflected on the consequences of "The End of 
Laissez-Faire" in the disorder following World War I and searched 
for the bases of a possible new order "somewhere between the 
individual and the modern state", he looked backward to those 
previous experiences and proposed "a return, it may be said, 
towards medieval conceptions of separate autonomies" as a way out 
of the impasse (Keynes, 1926, 1963). At the risk of being 
accused of reactionary nostalgia, Streeck and I have followed 
Keynes’ advice and asked what such an order might look like if it 
were to emerge in the contemporary world.
At its core is a distinctive principle of interaction and 
allocation of resources among a privileged set of actors. These 
are organizations defined by their common purpose of defending 
and promoting interests —  mostly class, sectoral and 
professional associations. Their central principle is that of 
inter— organizational concertation, i.e. negotiation among a 
limited and exclusive set of actors who mutually recognize each 
other’s status and entitlements and are capable of reaching and 
implementing relatively stable compromises (pacts or social 
CQQtcacts)- An associative-corporative order is, therefore, 
based primarily upon interaction between complex organizations 
and, secondarily, upon their interactions with their members and 
the state, whose resources or support are necessary for the 





























































































It is when we turn to the "enabling conditions" in Table II that 
the distinctiveness o-f an associative-corporative order becomes 
most manifest, especially in contrast to that postulated by 
pluralist theories based on pressure politics. For some time, 
the dominant way of analyzing collective action in defense of 
interests relied on an uneasy amalgam of community and market 
assumptions. According to it, interest associations sprung into 
existence spontaneously and acted autonomously on the basis of a 
unity of shared norms and perceptions —  both communitarian 
properties. They attracted members on a voluntary basis, farmed 
into multiple, overlapping and competing units, entered into 
shifting "parallelograms of group forces" according to the issue 
at hand, used whatever means tended to produce the best immediate 
results, and gained influence roughly proportional to the 
intensity of their preferences and the magnitude of their 
resources —  all characteristics of market-like relations. The 
emergent neo-corporatist paradigm of the 1970s challenged each of 
these assumptions and suggested that a different logic of 
collective action might be more apposite.
In a first approximation, this logic can be characterized as 
follows. In a community, member preferences are intecdependBQt 
based on shared norms and jointly produced satisfactions. In a 
market order, the actions of competitors are independent since no 
single actor is supposed to have a determinant and predictable 
impact upon the eventual allocation of satisfactions. In a 
state-dominated model, actors are dependent upon hierarchical 
coordination which makes their choices heteronomously determined 




























































































legitimate authority and coercive capacity. In an associative-
corporative order, actors are stcatea.Lcal.Ly LQtecdep.eQd.eQt in the 
sense that actions of select organizations do have a determinant 
and predictable effect (positive or negative) on the satisfaction 
of each other’s interests —  and this is what induces them to 
search for relatively stable pacts. For this to occur, 
contracting associations have to have attained, if not a symmetry 
in resources, at least reciprocal capacities for affecting each 
other and for representing and controlling the behavior of their 
members (and, where necessary, the reactions of possible 
mavericks). This usually implies that they have an effective 
monopoly in their status as intermediaries for a given class, 
sector or profession. As long as interest associations are 
fragmented into rival communities, organized into competing 
markets for members and/or resources, or manipulated from above 
by state authority, the enabling conditions for a distinctive 
associative-corporative order do not exist. Since this is the 
case for many policy arenas and even for many whole societies, it 
is obviously not appropriate to speak in these cases of a fourth 
order alongside the community, market and state. It would be even 
less appropriate to speak of its emergence as an ineluctable 
necessity if general social order is to survive. Some capitalist 
economies seem to do quite well with little or no help from PIGs, 
even if their ruling institutions may be less governable 
(Schmitter, 1980).
The medium or "currency" in which the associative model deals is 
LQ£LueQce, conditioned by mutual recognitions of status and 
entitlements. Of course, concerting groups may occasionally 




























































































their monetary resources, their bloc votes and even their 
credible threats to use coercion should the negotiative process 
break down, but in the course o-f their normal interaction they 
make "reasonable" demands on each other and pay "prudent" respect 
to state and public concerns. Fundamentally, they are informing 
each other about the magnitude and intensity of their preferences 
and the strategies they would adopt if agreement is not reached. 
They offer, in return for the satisfaction of some uncertain 
part of these preferences, to deliver the compliance of their 
members. As many have pointed out (Nedelmann and Meier, 1977, 
were perhaps the first to do so), such exchanges depend on 
political factors and can be quite unstable solutions. Their 
viability and efficacy can, however, be considerably enhanced if, 
as a result of iterative efforts at concertation, the 
participating associations manage to acquire new resources. 
Inter-organizational trust is perhaps the most important (and 
difficult to measure) of those mentioned under Rubrique 6 in 
Table II. Others are guaranteed access, compulsory contributions 
and/or membership, institutionalized (if often informal) forums 
for intermediation, centralized administrative structure, 
comprehensive scope of representation, legal jurisdiction and 
enhanced control over member behavior, and delegated policy 
tasks. Many of these emergent properties require, as we have 
noted above, the complicity —  if not active collaboration —  of 
state authorities.
The motivational structure of an associative-corporative order is 
perhaps less distinctive from community, market and state 
arrangements than its other attributes, at least with regard to 




























































































the motives of association leaders and administrators should be
largely determined by the needs of the organizational context 
within which they operate and from which they draw most of their 
resources. At the center of these are desires for organizatianal 
development, administrative stability and strategic autonomy 
(Schmitter and Streeck, 1981). Eventually, this should lead to a 
professionalization of management within all of the interacting 
associations and a consequent decline in their dependence upon 
voluntary support and elected leadership.
The motives of subordinate actors, i.e. of associational members, 
are more difficult to discern and to sustain since they are being 
forced to give up what may often be attractive opportunities for 
acting individually or collectively through other channels. In 
exchange for this, they are compelled to accept compromised, 
longer-term and more public-regarding obligations negotiated on 
their behalf by their respective class, sectoral or professional 
representatives. This may be less of a problem for those 
categories of interest where individual actors are very weak and 
dispersed, e.g. farmers, unskilled workers, petty bourgeois, but 
it could pose a serious challenge in those categories where 
"going-it-alone" through market power or state influence is a 
real alternative, e.g. capitalists and privileged professions. 
Presumably what motivates subordinates to conform to 
associational1y negotiated pacts is a decrease in uncertainty 
about aggregate outcomes and an increase in their assurance of 
receiving a proportionately more equitable share of whatever is 
disputed and distributed than would otherwise be the case. If 
one adds to these motives the probability that certain conditions 




























































































unemployment and 1 ower stri ke rates, will be superior in
societies whose markets have been "tamed" by associative-
corporative action , then we have an even more compelling reason
-for understanding member conformity (Schmidt, 1982, 1983; 
Cameron, 1983; Shon-field, 1984).
One could argue that what happens is a shi-ft in the rationality 
of social choice. In communities, the calculus rests on 
"satisfying identity", in markets —  economic or political —  on 
"maximizing preferences/forging minimum winning coalitions”; and 
in states on "mimimizing risk/maximizing predictabi1ity". What 
associations in a prospective corporative order strive for is 
something more prosaic, but quite rational given the structural 
complexity and informational overload of modern societies, 
namely, "satisficing interests". By deliberate mutual 
adjustments in their expectations and succesive iterations of 
their exchanges, these privileged actors may avoid the temptation 
to exploit momentary positional advantages to the maximum and the 
fate of landing in the worst possible outcome in which all lose. 
In short, they manage to solve the prisoners' dilemma inherent in 
unconstrained interest politics through the development of inter—  
organizational trust, backed by devolved public authority. The 
price paid for this is a lengthy and cumbersome deliberation 
process and a series of "second-best" compromises which are often 
difficult to justify on aesthetic or normative grounds.
Communities presumably decide by unanimous consent, markets by 
consumer preference or majority rule, and states by authoritative 
adjudication. An associative-corporative arrangement or private 




























































































formula which begins with parity representation, works through a 
sequence of proportional adjustments such as "splitting-the- 
difference" or "package-dealing" and then ratifies the final pact 
by concurrent consent. All this takes time and is vulnerable to 
substantive and normative assaults from communitarian, market and 
state sources. Usually, the deliberations are kept informal and 
secretive in an effort to insulate them as much as possible from 
outside pressure or from dissidents from within associational 
ranks (Marin, 1982,1983). The arcane "weighting" of influences 
and the complex calculation of proportionality and equity may 
seem, especially to outsiders, to involve arbitrary standards and 
mysterious forces —  nothing like the neat and obvious decisional 
rules of solidaristic unanimity, consumer sovereignty, majority 
vote or authoritative interpretation characteristic of the other 
three models of social order. These elements of lack of 
accountability to individual citizens and inequality in group 
access—  combined with the unavoidably compromised nature of the 
decisions eventually made —  can create a rather serious 
legitimacy problem for associative-corporative arrangements and 
expose them to strenuous normative attack by the proponents of 





























































































Neo-corporatist arrangements, in general, and private interest 
governments, in particular, require legitimation if they are to 
function efficaciously and durably. Their actions must stand a 
high probability of being obeyed voluntarily (but not necessarily 
enthusiastically) by those affected by them, as well as by those 
participating in them. Whatever the underlying role played by 
devolutions of state authority, if enough citizens reject them on 
either substantive or procedural grounds, the costs of arriving 
at such agreements and especially of implementing them would 
quickly exceed their utility.
As many have observed, neo-corporatism faces a serious legitima­
tion problem. At first, this was seen largely in terms of its 
unfortunate etymological association with certain interwar exper­
iences in authoritarian cocpacatLyLsaiQ, CQCBQcati.sme, Locnacaz; 
t,i.yi.SCQUS, etc. Indeed, in certain countries such as France, 
discussion has been virtually paralyzed until quite recently by 
this linguistic "hang-up". The more inventive Italians and Ger—  
mans rather quickly resolved the issue by dropping out the "iv" 
and referring to CQCP.QcatLsmQ and KQCP.Qcat.Ls(nus as Anglo-Saxon 
imposed neologisms conveniently purged of their discredited past 
associations. But hiding behind this rather superficial matter 
is the much more substantial issue of how such transformations in 
the mode of interest intermediation and/or policy-making can be 
justified.
The matter is made more difficult by the partial and 
surreptitious way in which these arrangements have "crept into" 
the interstices of community, market and state mechanisms. They 




























































































their activities have often been carefully shielded from their 
potential opponents. Not only are their allocative mechanisms 
kept secret, but the very existence of private interest 
governments is often not known to the larger public. How many 
consumers of milk or clients of lawyers are aware of how the 
prices/fees they pay are determined? Indeed, much of the power 
of PIGs, especially of the segmental or selective sort, depends 
on such invisibility and ignorance. If their processes and 
consequences were better known and rendered accountable to wider 
publics, their legitimacy would no doubt suffer.
But the problem is not just one of cognition and 
conceptualication. Neo—corporatist arrangements face the task of 
legitimating themselves in relation to two very wel1-entrenched 
"normative complexes" of modern society. On the one hand, they 
must justify their existence with respect to existing community, 
market and state institutions; on the other hand, at least in the 
contemporary period, they must explain how they are compatible 
with the norms and proceedures of political democracy.
Each of the traditional "orders" presumptively has its own 
distinctive normative basis, principles of legitimacy which can 
be relied upon —  all else failing —  to generate support in the 
event of any particular conflict. Communities are founded on a 
sedimentation of customary practices; economic markets depend on 
general acceptance of the principle of private appropriation of 
assets and its specific expression in an agreed-upon set of 
property rights; political markets rest on a basic tolerance of 
social diversity and its embodiment in a framework of constitu­




























































































to its supposed indispensability asmacy, we have argued above, 
the guarantor of external security and protector of the internal 
public interest. Neo-corporatism enjoys no such supportive a 
symbolic status —  just the vague allegation that it somehow 
"works" to produce quantitatively more desirable market outcomes, 
further justified in some cultures by notions of "self-adminis­
tration", "subsidiarity", "social peace" and/or "social partner­
ship" inherited from the past. It would be no exaggeration to 
suggest that it has been so far a consumer, not a producer of 
legitimacy, and that its supplier has largely been the state. 
For reasons discussed above, this transaction is a precarious one 
for both sides, especially where such bargains have taken the 
form of sectoral and selective arrangements. Continued reliance 
upon it may well weaken the normative basis of state authority by 
undermining its pretence to the universalistic, 1egal-rational,
treatment of citizens acid diminish the concrete effectiveness of 
interest associations in delivering the voluntary compliance of 
their members. This is not meant to imply that a "legitimacy 
crisis" is impending which will ineluctably sweep away "segmented 
corporatism" and its "fragmented state", just that the long-run 
problems of this mode of intermediation and policy-making are not 
confined to equity in the generation of material benefits or 
symmetry in the development of organizational capacities —  the 
two issues which have heretofore attracted the most critical 
attenti on.
No doubt, legal scholars and legalistic ideologues are already 
busy explaining why it is both necessary and desirable that such 
a segmentation of the norm-generation process should occur and 




























































































disparate efforts should be left to informal arrangements with 
obscure catDC^teDCES and arcane procedures and definitely not be 
exposed to excessive par1iamentary scrutiny or centralized 
judicial review —  much less to contentious public discussion. 
After all, the law has long been divided into civi1/criminal, 
public/private, national/international domains and specialized 
fields covering maritime, commercial, administrative and other 
matters have been recognized without diminishing the state’s 
claim to embodying legal consistency. Why not add "dairy law", 
"artisans’ law", "steel-making law" and "health service law" and 
admit that each might adopt distinctive standards and obligations 
and be formulated by different bargaining processes? The end 
result could come to ressemble the feudal SlandEStaat, except 
that, instead of the old lumpy blocs of nobles, clergy and bour­
geois (supplemented here and there by peasants), the emerging 
post-liberal Staadfistaal would have to have considerably more 
categories of differentiated privilege and obligation. 
Legitimizing formulae can presumably be found —  the von Gierke/ 
guild socialist/early pluralist tradition might be of some help
—  which would make these trends consistent with the state’s 
institutional interest in retaining its status as the sole source
of legitimate coercion and its image as the ultimate guardian of 
public interest. Indeed, if citizens were to have to choose 
between a neo-liberal dlaaiaQtLEaiEQt of state functions and a neo­
socialist di.slEati.aQ of them, many might prefer and be prepared 
to justify a neo-corporatist dlspECSlQQ of them.
Whether or not these choices will be put to them and which they 
will be free to select may well depend upon the second "normative 
complete’ of modern society which was mentioned above. namely, 




























































































in the contemporary period, it is not enough that policy 
instruments be somehow compatible with community standards, 
economic principles and state interests. They must also not 
violate too egregiously the norms and procedures of democratic 
politics. Whether neo-corporat i st arrangements are su-f -f i ci entl y 
compatible with existing citizen expectations to ensure their 
legitimacy, or whether they are potentially capable o-f altering 
those expectations to their -favor is a subject which is beyond 
the allotted scope (and length) o-f this essay. Fortunately, the 
attention o-f scholars of varying persuasion (Cf. Offe, 1903; 
























































































































































































* As is the case with much of what I have been writing on this 
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